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Within the huge and storied political panorama of Africa, the West African sub-region has sure distinctive options that set it other than the remainder of the continent. Boafo-Arthur (2008) referred to as it the “heartbeat of politics in Sub-Saharan Africa”, claiming that it served because the vanguard of armed resistance towards colonial rule. Liberia, which gained independence in 1847, is the oldest African republic. Ghana was the primary nation in Sub-Saharan Africa to realize independence in 1957. Guinea’s independence from France in 1958 proved to be the primary in a line of dominoes that finally led to the independence of the remaining Francophone international locations within the continent.
Sadly, West Africa additionally has the doubtful distinction of ushering in a phenomena that may plague the continent for the subsequent sixty years; regime adjustments by way of technique of navy coup d’états. The literature consensually agrees that the Togolese coup of 1963, which noticed the assassination of prime minister Sylvanus Olympio, set the blueprint for all of Africa’s forays into navy adventurism (Owusu, 1971; Conteh-Morgan, 2000; Boafo-Arthur, 2008; Kemmence, 2013). McGowan and Johnson (1984) would describe West Africa as ‘the area par excellence of the navy coup d’état’ for having the best report of coup exercise in comparison with wherever else on this planet. McGowan and Johnson (1984) and Kemmence (2013) famous that, regardless of encompassing one-third of all majority-ruled African States, this sub-region has seen about half of all profitable coups d’états, one-third of all reported coups and half of all reported plots within the continent. The one nation out of the 16 international locations within the sub-region that has by no means witnessed a navy coup to this date is Cape Verde.
What makes West Africa weak to coups? This paper, upon synthesis of the surveyed literature, recognized three broad causes, specifically ethnic fractionalization, lack of financial progress and navy dominance over civilians. All of those components work in synergy with one another, creating an setting conducive for coup actions.
The connection between social cleavages between ethnic teams and the persistence of coups was additional operationalized by Jackson (1978) into three components; social mobilization, cultural pluralism and political components such because the prevailing political get together system and mass participation. In keeping with him, whereas a single-party system has a stabilizing impact on governments in international locations that lately attained independence, a variety of political events can create a turbulent socio-political ecosystem. When confronted with electoral turnout, this destabilizing impact brought on by a multi-party political equipment is additional amplified by the dominance of a single ethnic group. Most West African international locations affiliate political events with ethnic groupings (Kemmence, 2013). This partisanship seeps into the navy, creating circumstances for rivalries that finally lead to coups and counter-coups. A outstanding instance of a multi-party system and ethnic fractionalization catalyzing instability was in Benin after it declared independence from France. The interval between 1960 and 1972 noticed a cavalcade of regime adjustments by way of coups, with figures like Hubert Maga, Sourou-Migan Apithy and Justin Ahomadegbe-Tometin rising to energy; all three of those males represented a special political get together, and every political get together predominantly represented a special ethnic group coming from totally different areas in Benin. Alternatively, freshly unbiased Niger was dominated for probably the most half by a single-party regime, which managed to stabilize the rebellion of the much less dominant Touareg group towards the dominant Hausa group. Although the previous instance noticed better success of coup-realization, it’s plain that ethnic fractionalization has created circumstances for the plotting and try (if not success) of coups in each these international locations.
Coming to financial efficiency, Johnson and McGowan (1984) offered empirical proof which prompt that financial underperformance was a major issue that might doubtlessly result in coups. Additionally they argued that some measures of optimistic financial efficiency, equivalent to excessive ranges of productive employment, sturdy financial progress, sound export efficiency and diversified commodity exports, are extremely stabilizing. Nevertheless, Adebayo (2002) challenged this evaluation by pointing to Nigeria and Togo repeatedly present process regime adjustments and (failed) coup makes an attempt, regardless of their outstanding financial progress. Clearly, there’s some lack of consensus within the literature concerning the influence of financial underperformance on the chance of coup makes an attempt, although this paper argues that Johnson and McGowan (1984) made a extra compelling case by finding out underlying antecedents to coup actions in all international locations of Africa.
Lastly, navy dominance over civilians additionally performs a job in subverting the socio-political order. Janowitz (1977) and Kemmence (2013) each addressed the nigh non-existent civil-military relations in West Africa; Kemmence argued that the repetitive navy coups in Guinea-Bissau had been a direct results of the shortage of civil-military relations. He argued:
…although the nation has a civil authorities, the navy dictates and controls each transfer of the civil rulers who’re truly the puppets of the generals within the navy
A studying of West Africa’s post-colonial political historical past means that the navy and civilians always feud with one another, with each teams having their very own inner cleavages and energy struggles, finally leading to tumultuous civil discord. In the end, the navy virtually at all times emerges because the dominant actor in instances of battle. This leads us to query, why would the navy wish to intrude within the political functioning of those international locations? McBride (2004) chalks it down to private greed, motivated by the wealth and privileges loved as soon as they achieve energy and management over the state. How is it that the navy is ready to simply overpower civilians on this sub-region? Adebajo and Rashid (2002) contend that it’s due to the huge assets on the disposal of the navy, establishing a correlation between navy spending and occurence of coups. Nigeria, as an example, has probably the most resourceful navy in all of Africa they usually’ve reported probably the most coup plots (together with failed makes an attempt and successes) at fifteen as of 2018.
Are the relentless coups undermining democratization in West Africa?
In keeping with the Polity IV scores of West African nations between 1958 to 2018, 7 out of 15 international locations (excluding Cape Verde) have, sooner or later, acquired a rating that may place them in every of the Polity IV classes; autocracy (-10 to -6), closed anocracy (-5 to -1), open anocracy (0 to five) and democracy (6 to 10). These international locations are Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Niger and Nigeria. Cote D’Ivoire, Guinea and Mauritania have acquired scores sooner or later on this interval that positioned their regime sort as both autocratic, closed anocratic or open anocratic. Nevertheless, they by no means scored excessive sufficient to be thought of democratic. Togo is the one nation to not have progressed past the ‘closed anocracy’ regime sort. Liberia, Mali and Sierra Leone have undergone all regime sorts aside from closed anocracy, whereas Senegal has undergone all regime sorts aside from open anocracy. Scatter-plots illustrating durations of every regime sort for every nation is offered in Appendix 1, graphs 1 to 4. An inspection of the scatter-plots demonstrates that, for many international locations, their standing as a ‘democracy’, ‘anocracy’ or ‘autocracy’ isn’t outlined by a steady time-period, however is reasonably dispersed all through their historical past. Ghana, as an example, began as an autocracy post-independence and, following a 1978 coup, was labeled as a democracy. Nevertheless, following the 1981 coup, Ghana as soon as once more regressed into an autocratic regime. Over time, the regime turned progressively much less autocratic, till it achieved full democracy as soon as it attained some stability (Appendix 2). Related traits could be noticed in Gambia, Liberia, Mali and a number of other different international locations within the sub-region. This development is indicative of the destabilizing energy of coup d’états and the way they undermine the democratization of this sub-region. Boafo-Arthur (2004) and Conteh-Morgan (2000) argued that the political instability shepherded by the tradition of militarism has jeopardized the institution of a gentle democracy within the sub-region. The onset of the third wave of democracy within the early Nineteen Nineties did arouse some optimism that the sub-region is on the verge of reaching political equilibrium. Nevertheless, the expectations of a secure democracy are but to materialize (Boafo-Arthur, 2004). Côte d’Ivoire is one instance of a rustic that was an aspiration within the sub-region for sustaining stability and progressing in the direction of a full democracy. Sadly, the nation imploded following a number of coup makes an attempt from 1999 to 2002. Sierra Leone and Liberia are nonetheless making an attempt to forge a secure political mannequin after landmark elections in 2002 and 2005, respectively. The elections within the two international locations additionally marked the tip years of civil wars. In 1997, Liberia had an election (albeit, beneath questionable circumstances in response to Boafo-Arthur (2004)) to finish the civil battle that began in late 1989. Charles Taylor received that election however the instability in Liberia (principally inspired by Taylor himself), continued till he was compelled into exile in Nigeria in 2003. In a nutshell, the West African sub-region has struggled to attain sustained democracy within the face of speedy regime adjustments.
Figuring out some analysis gaps: Are democratic regimes actually much less prone to coups in West Africa?
As talked about within the earlier sub-section of the literature assessment, an amazing majority of the nations in West Africa have skilled the total spectrum of regime sorts, starting from autocracy to democracy, of their brief post-colonial historical past. Moreover, all 15 international locations beneath examination, besides Senegal, confronted at the least one reported coup try in every of the regime sorts that they skilled. That is illustrated within the scatter-plot given in Appendix 3. Senegal skilled just one coup try on this interval, when Mamadou Dia did not overthrow sitting president Leopold Sedar Senghor in 1962. Senegal had a polity rating of -4 in 1962 (making it a closed anocracy that yr) and has not confronted a coup try since.
On condition that lots of these nations have skilled at the least one coup in every regime sort, this sub-region could be ultimate for finding out whether or not democratic regimes are really extra prone or resilient to coups than autocratic and anocratic regimes. Nevertheless, only a few research have empirically explored this sub-region particularly (outdoors of research wanting into Sub-Saharan Africa as a complete) and investigated country-wise results.
The connection between regime sorts and their susceptibility to coup makes an attempt is a contentious one among students; Tulaslem (2015) referred to it as an “empirical conundrum that continues to be unsolved”. Huntington (1968), Linz (1978), and O’Donnell (1979) all argue towards the standard knowledge that democracies are resilient to regime instability, primarily as a result of they invite political pluralism. The domineering presence of curiosity teams tends to weaken the state from finishing up its capability to manipulate successfully. When financial modernization outpaces the event of democratic political establishments, the emergence of political order and stability turns into much less probably. Consequently, coups, revolutions, and the breakdown of democratic establishments are probably situations in extremely democratic regimes. Powell et al (2017) discovered that younger democracies are extra predisposed to coup makes an attempt than both civilian authoritarian regimes or older democracies. Whereas none of this literature focuses on West Africa particularly, the findings could be related to establishing a priori expectations of this paper’s ultimate outcomes.
Alternatively, trendy empirical research by Casper and Tyson (2014), Marinov (2014), Tusalem (2015) and Bell (2016) have offered ample proof utilizing a world pattern that democracies (with the next Polity IV rating) are much less coup-prone than autocracies; Bell (2016) has additionally validated this speculation for Sub-Saharan African nations individually. Actually, probably the most convincing argument for anticipating West African democracies to be much less coup-prone than autocracies could be discovered within the aforementioned Powell et al. (2017) paper, which primarily echoes the literature surveyed up to now:
…we recall that coup perpetrators should come from both the navy or different elites within the state equipment—individuals who already get pleasure from a privileged standing in society. Thus, leaders searching for regime change are more likely to exhaust different authorized channels earlier than perpetrating a coup and are most probably to take action solely once they count on their management to trigger a major enchancment in the established order
Moreover, all of the aforementioned literature concedes that coups come up extra continuously when coup plotters have real targets of making each financial prosperity and political legitimacy. Financial prosperity could be achieved by opening an economic system to international assist, funding, and worldwide enterprise transactions-all of that are strongly tied to democracy (Tusalem, 2015; Powell et al., 2017). Thus, it’s affordable to imagine that in West Africa, coups are extra usually plotted to both escape conditions of non-democracy or to strengthen democracy, since this sub-region is economically disadvantaged and politically unstable. This paper shall, due to this fact, hypothesize that the chances of a coup try occurring in an autocracy or anocracy is larger than that of a democracy, and try and validate this speculation.
Analysis Questions
A assessment of the literature leads us to the next speculation:
H1A: Autocracies and anocracies have better odds of dealing with a coup try than democracies. In different phrases, as the standard of democracy will increase, the extra resilient to coups a West African nation is.
The opposite hypotheses this paper might be validating are:
H1B: Financial progress reduces the chances of a coup try occurring in a rustic
H1C: Elevated ethnic fractionalization will increase the chances of a coup try occurring in a rustic.
H1D: Elevated navy resourcefulness will increase the chances of a coup try occurring in a rustic
Empirical Evaluation
Information and analysis design
With a purpose to take a look at the aforementioned hypotheses, this paper shall analyze an unbalanced panel information of 15 West African international locations from 1958 to 2018. Since Cape Verde has not confronted even a single coup try on this time-frame, we now have excluded it from the evaluation. It’s because there isn’t a variability on this topic that can provide extra insights when analyzing fixed-effects. This paper will make the most of a logistic regression and take a look at it for nation fixed-effects and random results, because of the truth that the dependent variable is binary. On condition that we’re analyzing panel information, the unit of research is country-years. All statistical analyses had been carried out on the StataMP 14.1 statistical bundle.
Purposeful type of fastened and random results logistic mannequin and easy instinct behind deciphering the coefficients
Assuming that the panel information has N international locations for T time durations, the purposeful type of the logistic ‘unobserved results’ mannequin is as follows:
㏒e(pit / 1 – pit) = αi + β0 + Xitβ ∀i = 1(1)N,t = 1(1)T
Right here, pit is the conditional chance that at the least one coup might be tried in a rustic i in yr t, given Xit, β and αi. Due to this fact, pit / 1-pit , is the chances that at the least one coup might be tried in that country-year.
Xit is the 1xk matrix of unbiased variables.
β is the kx1 matrix of parameters.
β0 is the intercept time period.
αi known as ‘the unobserved impact’. This will embody, as an example, some unobserved historic or institutional components for some nation i. Within the fixed-effects mannequin, we assume that αi is correlated with some or all the explanatory variables. Nevertheless, within the random results mannequin, αi is uncorrelated with the matrix of unbiased variables.
Now, for each fashions,
pit / 1 – pit = eαi + β0 + Xitβ .
Due to this fact, a one-unit enhance within the worth of unbiased variable Xitj will lead to a eβj issue change within the odds, ceteris paribus. If 0<eβj<1, then a rise within the worth of Xitj will result in lowered odds that at the least one coup might be tried in a country-year. If eβj>1, then a rise within the worth of Xitj will result in elevated odds that at the least one coup might be tried in a country-year. Right here, eβj would be the coefficients on every of the unbiased variables within the ultimate estimation outcomes, and known as the odds-ratio.
Dependent variable
The dependent variable is “coup try” and was drawn from Powell and Thyne[1], who describe coups as “makes an attempt by the navy or different elites inside the state equipment to unseat the sitting head of presidency utilizing unconstitutional means”. This paper defines “coup makes an attempt” as a dichotomy, distinguishing between these country-years the place a coup try was not skilled (0) from these through which the country-year skilled at the least one try (1). This paper included coup makes an attempt that succeeded or failed, just because the purpose is to elucidate the components that result in coup makes an attempt reasonably than the end result of an try.
Unbiased variables
a) This paper utilized the Polity IV[2] as a proxy to measure the standard of democracy in every country-year. A Polity rating starting from -10 to -6 locations a regime as an ‘autocracy’ (auto), -5 to -1 as a ‘closed anocracy’ (closed_ano), 0 to five as an ‘open anocracy’ (open_ano) and 6 to 10 as a ‘democracy’ (demo). Fairly than utilizing the Polity rating to measure the standard of democracy, this paper shall as an alternative denote the regime sort for every country-year. That is accomplished to obviously and higher distinguish regime sorts, and to conclusively take a look at our speculation. Thus, the resultant ‘regime sort’ variable is an ordinal categorical variable which could be cut up into 4 dummies; for this evaluation, we might be utilizing the ‘demo’ dummy because the reference group. It’s anticipated that the coefficients (or odds-ratio) on the three named dummy variables might be better than 1
b) ‘Financial progress” (GDPPC) is denoted by the GDP per capita (US$, present costs). This information was acquired from the World Financial institution database[3]. It’s anticipated that the coefficient on this variable might be lower than 1.
c) Ethnic fractionalization (EF) is measured utilizing the Historic Index of Ethnic Fractionalization offered by the Harvard.edu Dataverse database[4] for every country-year. The Index ranges from 0 to 1 and the upper the worth of the index, the better the ethnic fractionalization. It’s anticipated that the coefficient on this variable might be better than 1.
d) Army Spending (MS) of every country-year (in million US$, present costs) will act as a proxy for navy resourcefulness. The information was acquired from the SIPRI Army Expenditure Database[5]. It’s anticipated that the coefficient on this variable might be better than 1.
Estimation Outcomes
The overall variety of country-years current within the panel information is 867. Nevertheless, because of lacking values, solely 688 observations had been appropriate for evaluation. The logistic regression output is offered in Appendix 4. The coefficients symbolize the chances ratio related to the variable. Mannequin 1 introduces nation random results whereas mannequin 2 introduces nation fastened results. Each fashions have a excessive sufficient chi-square statistic to point the general significance of the fashions. The pseudo R-square of the fastened results specification is 0.054 which signifies a good however not glorious match.
By way of the estimation of the coefficients, the outcomes are constant throughout each specs. In each fashions, the estimated coefficients on the three regime sorts are better than 1. In different phrases, if a rustic switches from being a democracy to an autocracy or anocracy, the chances of that nation dealing with a coup try will increase. This end result aligns with a priori expectations, and the “regime sort” variable is statistically important in each fashions.
Equally, in each fashions, the estimated odds-ratio on the variable GDPPC is lower than one. In different phrases, financial progress reduces the chances {that a} nation will face a coup try in a given yr. This end result aligns with a priori expectations, and this variable is statistically important in each fashions.
The estimated coefficient on the variable EF is larger than one in each fashions. Thus, elevated ethnic fractionalization in a rustic will increase the chances of a coup try. This aligns with a priori expectations. Nevertheless, this variable is barely statistically important within the nation fixed-events specified mannequin. That is in all probability as a result of the fixed-effects mannequin will take into account variability in ethnic fractionalization inside international locations versus between international locations just like the random-effects mannequin does. Thus, it could actually result in adjustments within the calculation of the usual errors of the variables.
The estimated coefficient on the variable MS is larger than 1 in each fashions. Thus, elevated navy resourcefulness in a rustic will increase the chances of a coup try. This aligns with a priori expectations. This variable is statistically important in each fashions.
Choosing applicable specification: Aikake Data Standards (AIC) and the Hausman Take a look at
The fixed-effects mannequin has a decrease Aikake Data Standards (494.26) than the random-effects mannequin (565.56). Due to this fact, the fixed-effects mannequin is a extra appropriate specification than the random-effects mannequin. To additional set up that the fixed-effects mannequin is the extra applicable specification, the Hausman Take a look at was carried out. The chi-square statistic was excessive sufficient that we might reject the null speculation that the random-effects mannequin is suitable at 5% stage of significance. Consequently, all of the variables (together with EF) are statistically important if we take into account the fixed-effects specification. The outcomes for the Hausman Take a look at are given in Appendix 5.
The variance affect components (VIFs) for the unbiased variables are additionally offered in Appendix 5; since all of the VIFs are beneath 10, we will reject the presence of multicollinearity amongst the explanatory variables. The VIFs are additionally offered in Appendix 5.
Solidifying the connection between regime sorts and their resiliency to coup makes an attempt: Cross-tabulation, Pearson’s chi-square take a look at for independence and rank-biserial correlation
The cross-tabulation in Appendix 6 exhibits the frequency distribution of country-years in response to ‘coup try’ and ‘regime sort’. Democracies have the bottom relative frequency of country-years the place at the least one coup was tried out of all regime sorts (9.68%), adopted by closed anocracies (13.71%), then open anocracies (18.55%%) and at last autocracies (58.06%). Solely 6.28% of democratic country-years have seen at the least one coup try, whereas 19.2% of autocratic country-years have seen at the least one coup try.
The Pearson’s chi-square take a look at statistic to check for independence between the 2 categorical variables is given as:
χ2 = N∑i,j pi * pj (((Oi,j / N) – pi * pj) / (pi * pj))2 ∀I = 1(1)r , j = 1(1)c
The place r is the variety of rows (on this case, 2) and c is the variety of columns (on this case, 4) within the two-way contingency desk. Right here, Oi,j is the variety of observations within the ith row and jth column. N is the overall variety of observations (867). Lastly, pi is the marginal relative frequency of row i
and pj is the marginal relative frequency of column j
If the null speculation is true that the prevalence of a coup try is unbiased from the regime sort in a country-year, then the take a look at statistic follows a chi-square distribution with (r-1)(c-1) levels of freedom (which is the same as 3 on this case). Right here, the Pearson’s chi-square take a look at statistic is excessive sufficient that we will reject the null speculation that the prevalence of a coup try is unbiased of regime sort in any respect typical ranges of significance.
Nevertheless, the Pearson’s chi-square take a look at doesn’t present any info on the magnitude and route of the connection between the 2 variables. The rank-biserial correlation coefficient, which is a particular case of the Somers’ D measure, is an index of affiliation between a binary nominal variable (coup try) and an ordinal categorical variable (regime sort). The measure is calculated as:
rrb = (NC– ND) / (NC + ND + NT )
The place,
NC=303*17+303*23+303*12+148*23+148*12+113*12=22292 is the variety of concordant pairs
ND=72*148+72*113+72*179+17*113+17*179+23*179=40761 is the variety of discordant pairs
NT= (743*124)- NC– ND=29079 is the variety of tied pairs
Thus, rrb= -0.20046238. This implies that there’s a reasonable, detrimental affiliation between the prevalence of at the least one coup try in a rustic yr and the regime sort.
The statistical analyses present ample proof that democracies are extra resilient to coups than anocracies and autocracies in West Africa. The better the standard of democracy, the much less is the chance of a coup try on this sub-region.
Conclusions
This paper validates the prevailing literature on the consequences of ethnic fractionalization, financial progress and navy resourcefulness on the chance of a coup try occurring in West Africa. Nevertheless, the susceptibility of democracy to navy coups on a world scale continues to stay an empirical quandary, given the divisive nature of the literature exploring this particular relationship. It’s vital to notice, nonetheless, that the findings of this paper are in line with comparable research accomplished in the complete Sub-Saharan Africa area. Whereas a world prescription might not be empirically substantiated, it’s clear that the antidote to the incessant regime adjustments and navy supremacy on this sub-region is democratization. Step one to herald democracy could be to fix the contaminated civil-military relations. Each civil leaders and the navy should make concerted efforts to know their roles in nationwide service and safety. There may be additionally a have to normalize the condemnation of navy intervention into politics as undemocratic. Financial growth and social cohesion amongst ethnic teams are additionally crucial to make sure political stability and sustained democratization of the sub-region.
References
Boafo-Arthur, Ok. (2008). Democracy and stability in West Africa: the Ghanaian expertise. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet; Division of Peace and Battle Analysis, Uppsala College.
Conteh-Morgan, E. (2000). The navy and democratization in West Africa: Points, issues, and anomalies. Journal of Political & Army Sociology, 341-355.
Owusu, M. (1971). Tradition and democracy in West Africa: some persistent issues. Africa Immediately, 18(1), 68-76.
Kemence, Ok. O. (2013). Understanding the basis causes of navy coups and governmental instability in West Africa. Military Command and Basic Workers School Fort Leavenworth KS.
McGowan, P., & Johnson, T. H. (1984). African Army Coups d’etat and Underdevelopment: a Quantitative Historic Evaluation. The Journal of Trendy African research, 22(4), 633-666.
Jackman, R. (1978). The Predictability of Coups d’Etat. American Political Science Overview 72: 1262-1275.
Adebajo, A. (2002). Constructing peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Janowitz, M. (1977). Army establishments and coercion within the growing nations. College of Chicago Press.
Adebajo, A., & Rashid, I. (2004). West Africa’s safety challenges: Constructing peace in a troubled area. Lynne Rienner Writer.
Tusalem, R. F. (2015). Democracies, autocracies, and political stability. Worldwide Social Science Overview, 90(1), 1.
Bell, C. (2016). Coup d’état and democracy. Comparative Political Research, 49(9), 1167-1200.
Thyne, C. L., & Powell, J. M. (2016). Coup d’état or coup d’Autocracy? How coups influence democratization, 1950–2008. International coverage evaluation, 12(2), 192-213.
Huntington, S. (1968). Political Order in Altering Societies. Yale College Press
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Information Sources:
Powell, J., & Thyne, C. (2021). Coup d’Etat Information Set [Dataset 3]. Retrieved from: http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/coup_data/dwelling.htm
Middle for Systemic Peace. (2018). Polity4 Annual Time Sequence, 1946-2018. Retrieved from: https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
World Financial institution. GDP per capita (present US$). Retrieved from:
https://information.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
Drazanova, L. (2019). Historic Index of Ethnic Fractionalization Dataset (HIEF). (Harvard Dataverse, V2). Retrieved from:
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doipercent3A10.7910percent2FDVNpercent2F4JQRCL
SIPRI. (2020). SIPRI Army Expenditure Database. Retrieved from:
https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
Appendix 1
Durations of Every Regime Kind in Every Nation from 1958-2018
Graph 1
Supply: Compiled by creator from the Polity IV dataset
Graph 2
Supply: Compiled by creator from the Polity IV dataset
Graph 3
Supply: Compiled by creator from the Polity IV dataset
Graph 4
Supply: Compiled by creator from the Polity IV dataset
Appendix 2
Ghana’s Polity Rating and Coup Makes an attempt (1960-2018)
12 months | Polity Rating | Coup Try |
1960 | -8 | 0 |
1961 | -8 | 1 |
1962 | -9 | 0 |
1963 | -9 | 0 |
1964 | -9 | 0 |
1965 | -9 | 0 |
1966 | -7 | 1 |
1967 | -7 | 1 |
1968 | -7 | 0 |
1969 | -2 | 0 |
1970 | 3 | 0 |
1971 | 3 | 0 |
1972 | -7 | 1 |
1973 | -7 | 0 |
1974 | -7 | 0 |
1975 | -7 | 0 |
1976 | -7 | 0 |
1977 | -7 | 0 |
1978 | 0 | 1 |
1979 | 6 | 1 |
1980 | 6 | 0 |
1981 | -7 | 1 |
1982 | -7 | 1 |
1983 | -7 | 1 |
1984 | -7 | 1 |
1985 | -7 | 0 |
1986 | -7 | 0 |
1987 | -7 | 0 |
1988 | -7 | 0 |
1989 | -7 | 0 |
1990 | -7 | 0 |
1991 | -4 | 0 |
1992 | -1 | 0 |
1993 | -1 | 0 |
1994 | -1 | 0 |
1995 | -1 | 0 |
1996 | 2 | 0 |
1997 | 2 | 0 |
1998 | 2 | 0 |
1999 | 2 | 0 |
2000 | 2 | 0 |
2001 | 6 | 0 |
2002 | 6 | 0 |
2003 | 6 | 0 |
2004 | 8 | 0 |
2005 | 8 | 0 |
2006 | 8 | 0 |
2007 | 8 | 0 |
2008 | 8 | 0 |
2009 | 8 | 0 |
2010 | 8 | 0 |
2011 | 8 | 0 |
2012 | 8 | 0 |
2013 | 8 | 0 |
2014 | 8 | 0 |
2015 | 8 | 0 |
2016 | 8 | 0 |
2017 | 8 | 0 |
2018 | 8 | 0 |
Be aware: “Coup try” is a dichotomous measure which assumes the worth 1 if a coup try occurred in that nation yr (no matter whether or not it was a plot, failed try or success)
Appendix 3
Supply: Compiled by creator from the Polity IV dataset and Powell and Thyne coup dataset
Appendix 4
Mannequin 1: Random-effects logistic regression
Coup | Coef. | St.Err. | t-value | p-value | [95% Conf | Interval] | Sig | |
Auto | 2.758 | 1.125 | 2.49 | .013 | 1.24 | 6.135 | ** | |
closed_ano | 2.069 | .893 | 1.69 | .092 | .888 | 4.82 | * | |
open_ano | 3.875 | 1.878 | 2.80 | .005 | 1.499 | 10.016 | *** | |
GDPPC | .999 | 0 | -1.98 | .047 | .998 | 1 | ** | |
EF | 3.215 | 5.201 | 0.72 | .47 | .135 | 76.582 | ||
MS | 1.239 | .077 | 3.44 | .001 | 1.097 | 1.4 | *** | |
Fixed | .028 | .039 | -2.60 | .009 | .002 | .415 | *** | |
Fixed | -13.57 | 46.623 | .b | .b | -104.95 | 77.81 | ||
Imply dependent var | 0.151 | SD dependent var | 0.358 | |||||
Variety of obs | 688 | Chi-square | 30.627 | |||||
Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | Akaike crit. (AIC) | 565.563 | |||||
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 |
Mannequin 2: Conditional fixed-effects logistic regression
Coup | Coef. | St.Err. | t-value | p-value | [95% Conf | Interval] | Sig |
Auto | 2.767 | 1.196 | 2.35 | .019 | 1.185 | 6.457 | ** |
closed_ano | 2.252 | 1.056 | 1.73 | .083 | .899 | 5.644 | * |
open_ano | 3.371 | 1.696 | 2.42 | .016 | 1.258 | 9.035 | ** |
GDPPC | .999 | 0 | -1.73 | .084 | .998 | 1 | * |
EF | 1.722e+10 | 1.952e+11 | 2.08 | .038 | 3.866 | 7.671e+19 | ** |
MS | 1.21 | .09 | 2.56 | .01 | 1.046 | 1.4 | ** |
Imply dependent var | 0.151 | SD dependent var | 0.358 | ||||
Pseudo r-squared | 0.054 | Variety of obs | 688 | ||||
Chi-square | 27.402 | Prob > chi2 | 0.000 | ||||
Akaike crit. (AIC) | 494.262 | Bayesian crit. (BIC) | 521.465 | ||||
*** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1 |
Appendix 5
Hausman (1978) specification take a look at
Coef. | |
Chi-square take a look at worth | 11.969 |
P-value | .035 |
Variance Affect Elements of unbiased variables
Variable | VIF |
Auto | 3.43 |
closed_ano | 2.26 |
open_ano | 1.47 |
GDPPC | 2.58 |
EF | 7.19 |
MS | 2.64 |
Imply VIF | 3.26 |
Appendix 6
Tabulation of Coup Regime
Regime | ||||||
Coup | Autocracy | Closed Anocracy | Open Anocracy | Democracy | Whole | |
0 | 303 | 148 | 113 | 179 | 743 | |
40.78 | 19.92 | 15.21 | 24.09 | 100.00 | ||
80.80 | 89.70 | 83.09 | 93.72 | 85.70 | ||
1 | 72 | 17 | 23 | 12 | 124 | |
58.06 | 13.71 | 18.55 | 9.68 | 100.00 | ||
19.20 | 10.30 | 16.91 | 6.28 | 14.30 | ||
Whole | 375 | 165 | 136 | 191 | 867 | |
43.25 | 19.03 | 15.69 | 22.03 | 100.00 | ||
100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 | 100.00 |
Pearson Chi2 = 20.27 Prob = 0.0001
Be aware: First row has frequencies; second row has row percentages and third row has column percentages
[1] http://www.uky.edu/~clthyn2/coup_data/dwelling.htm
[2] https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html
[3] https://information.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD
[4] https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doipercent3A10.7910percent2FDVNpercent2F4JQRCL
[5] https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex
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