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On August 1, 1914, as dreadful struggle was breaking out in Europe, the German ambassador Prince Lichnowsky paid a go to to Britain’s International Secretary Sir Edward Gray. Dr Rudolf Steiner commented as follows upon this assembly – in a 1916 lecture which he gave in Switzerland:
‘A single sentence and the struggle within the West wouldn’t have taken place.’
At that assembly, he averred that, with only one sentence, ‘this struggle might have been averted.’[1]
To look at that outrageous-sounding declare, we delve into what’s a little bit of a thriller, that of the primary battle between Germany and Britain for a thousand years: two nations sure by the identical royal household, with each statesman in Europe loudly proclaiming that peace is desired, that struggle should in any respect prices be prevented; after which the massacre takes place, terminating the nice hopes for European civilization and extinguishing its vibrant optimism, as what have been arrange as defensive alliances mysteriously flipped over and have become offensive war-plans.
The ghastly ‘Schlieffen plan’ turned activated, because the master-plan of Germany’s self-defense, which because it have been contained the necessity for the dreadful velocity with which disaster was precipitated. France and Russia had fashioned a mutual protection settlement (everybody claimed their navy alliances have been defensive). Whereas Bismarck the clever statesman who based Germany had lived, this was prevented, such an alliance being his darkest nightmare. However Kaiser Wilhelm didn’t handle to keep away from this, and so Germany’s neighbors to East and West fashioned a mutual navy alliance. The Schlieffen plan was primarily based on the premise that Germany couldn’t combat a struggle on two fronts however would possibly have the ability to beat France rapidly; so within the occasion of struggle looming in opposition to Russia within the East, its troops needed to transfer westwards, crashing although Belgium as a route into France. All of it needed to occur rapidly as a result of Germany’s military was smaller than that of Russia.
The timing over these essential days reveals its terrible velocity: Russia mobilized its military on July twenty ninth, in response to hostilities breaking out between Austro-Hungary and Serbia; two determined cables have been despatched by the Kaiser to the Tsar on the twenty ninth and Thirty first, imploring him to not proceed with full mobilisation of his military as a result of that meant struggle; the French authorities ‘irreversibly determined’ to assist Russia within the struggle on the night of Thirty first, cabling this determination to the Russian international minister at 1 am on August 1st[2]; then, on the afternoon of that very same day Germany proceeded to mobilise and declared struggle on Russia, and two days later went into Belgium. Britain’s Home of Commons voted unanimously for struggle on fifth August, viewing Germany because the belligerent warmonger.
Kaiser Wilhelm’s Nemesis
The Kaiser had loved the fame of a peacemaker:
Now … he’s acclaimed all over the place as the best issue for peace that our time can present. It was he, we hear, who repeatedly threw the load of his dominating persona, backed by the best navy organisation on the planet – an organisation constructed up by himself – into the steadiness for peace wherever struggle clouds gathered over Europe. ‘(‘William II, King of Prussia and German Emperor, Kaiser 25 years a ruler, hailed as chief peacemaker,’ New York Occasions, 8 June, 1913.[3])
A former US President, William Howard Taft, mentioned of him: ‘The reality of historical past requires the decision that, contemplating the critically essential half which has been his among the many nations, he has been, for the final quarter of a century, the only best power within the sensible upkeep of peace on the planet.’ ([4],[5]). That’s some tribute! In 1960 a BBC centenary tribute to the Kaiser was permitted to say: ‘Emphasis was positioned on his love of England and his deep attachment to Queen Victoria,’ his grandmother.
A lover of peace …. expert diplomat … deep attachment to Queen Victoria .. so remind me what the Nice Warfare was for, that took 9 million lives?
Would possibly the struggle have been averted if the Kaiser had, maybe, focussed a bit extra on the artwork of struggle – chorus from marching into Belgium? There was no ‘plan B’! In later days the Kaiser used to say, he had been swept away by the navy timetable. Who neededthe struggle which locked Europe into such dreadful battle? Did a mere sequence of interlocking treaties deliver it on?
On the evening of 30-Thirty first of July, feeling entrapped by a seemingly inevitable march of occasions, Kaiser Wilhelm mused to himself doomily:
Frivolity and weak spot are going to plunge the world into essentially the most frightful struggle of which the final word object is the overthrow of Germany. For I now not have any doubt that England, Russia and France have agreed amongst themselves – figuring out that our treaty obligations compel us to assist Austria – to make use of the Austro-Serb battle as a pretext for waging a struggle of annihilation in opposition to us… On this means the stupidity and clumsiness of our ally [Austria] is was a noose. So the celebrated encirclement of Germany has lastly develop into an accepted reality… The web has all of the sudden been closed over our heads, and the purely anti-German coverage which England has been scornfully pursuing all around the world has received essentially the most spectacular victory which we’ve proved ourselves powerless to stop whereas they, having bought us regardless of our struggles on their lonesome into the web via our loyalty to Austria, proceed to throttle our political and financial existence. A powerful achievement, which even these for whom it means catastrophe are sure to admire.’[6]
‘These dreadful fields of mindless carnage’
Did a whole bunch of hundreds of younger males, the flower of England, need to exit to muddy fields, to combat and die? Shells, bayonets, gasoline, machine weapons – what was the purpose? By no means have been they defending their nation or its Empire – for no-one was threatening it. No European nation benefitted: it spelt destroy for all of them. Do we have to worry the imbecility of the poet’s phrases:
If I ought to die, assume solely this of me
There may be some nook of a international area
That’s ceaselessly England’? (Rupert Brooke)
A number one British pacifist, E.D. Morel, was broadly vilified for the views expressed in his e book Fact and the Warfare (1916), and had his well being wrecked (as Bertrand Russell described) by being put into Pentonville jail. In haunting phrases of perception, his e book described how: ‘These dreadful fields of mindless carnage’ had been led to by ‘futile and depraved Statecraft’ – by ‘an autocratic and secret international coverage’ carried out by these ‘who by secret plots and counter-plots … hound the peoples to mutual destruction.’ Of the struggle’s outbreak, Morel wrote: ‘It got here due to this fact to this. Whereas unfavourable assurances had been given to the Home of Commons, constructive acts diametrically opposed to those assurances had been concerted by the Warfare Workplace and the Admiralty with the authority of the International Workplace. All of the obligations of an alliance had been incurred, however incurred by essentially the most harmful and refined strategies; incurred in such a means as to go away the Cupboard free to disclaim the existence of any formal parchment recording them, and free to signify its coverage at dwelling and overseas as one among contractual detachment from the rival Continental teams.’[7] A complete analogy exists right here with Blair taking Britain into the Iraq struggle, making a cope with Bush whereas regularly denying again dwelling that any such deal existed. Two Cupboard members resigned in August 1914, as soon as the central significance of this hid contract turned evident: Viscount Morley and John Burns.
A extra orthodox, deterministic view was given by Winston Churchill: ‘the invasion of Belgium introduced the British Empire united to the sector. Nothing in human energy might break the deadly chain, as soon as it had begun to unroll. A state of affairs had been created the place a whole bunch of officers had solely to do their prescribed obligation to their respective nations to wreck the world. They did their obligation’.[8] That needed chain resulting in destroy started solely after the essential dialogue alluded to by Dr Steiner, we observe.
Contemplating that Germany went into Belgium on the third of August, whereas Churchill and Mountbatten, the First and Second Sea Lords, had ordered the mobilising of the British fleet over July 26 -Thirtieth, in order that by days earlier than the third a lot of the world’s greatest navy was up north of Scotland all able to pounce on Germany – his phrases could seem as some form of excessive restrict of hypocrisy. The mobilising of the British fleet was an enormous occasion which significantly pre-empted political dialogue, per week earlier than Britain declared struggle.[9],[10]
A Secret Alliance
Britain was obliged by no necessity to enter a European struggle, having no alliance with France that the folks of Britain or its parliament knew about, and having a protracted certainly regular coverage of avoiding embroilment in European conflicts. Nevertheless, ministers particularly Gray the International Minister had covertly made a cope with France. To cite from Bertrand Russell’s autobiography: ‘I had observed throughout earlier years how rigorously Sir Edward Gray lied with a purpose to stop the general public from figuring out the strategies by which he was committing us to the assist of France within the occasion of struggle.’[11] Would Britain be dragged right into a European struggle on the coat-tails of France – for hundreds of years, its conventional enemy – on condition that France had signed a treaty obligation to enter struggle in consequence of a German-Russian battle? France was eager to avenge previous grievances over the French-German border, conscious of the prevalence of troops which it and Russia mixed had in opposition to Germany – and satisfied that it might drag Britain into the fray.
On 24 March 1913, the Prime Minister had been requested in regards to the circumstances beneath which British troops would possibly land on the Continent. He replied, ‘As has been repeatedly said, this nation is just not beneath any obligation not public and recognized to parliament which compels it to participate in any struggle’ – a double unfavourable which hid a hidden however then-existing accord!
Final Hope of Peace
We flip now to the query put, on August 1st by Germany’s ambassador to Britain’s International Secretary, usually omitted from historical past books on the topic. If struggle and peace did certainly hinge upon it – as Dr Steiner averred – it might be price quoting a couple of judgements about it. Right here is Gray’s personal letter, written that day:
Gray’s letter to the British ambassador in Berlin: 1 August, regarding his assembly with Prince Lichnowsky:
‘He requested me whether or not, if Germany gave a promise to not violate Belgian neutrality we might have interaction to stay impartial. I replied that I couldn’t say that: our arms have been nonetheless free, and we have been contemplating what our angle ought to be….I didn’t assume that we might give a promise on that situation alone. The ambassador pressed me as as to whether I might formulate situations on which we might stay impartial. He even steered that the integrity of France and her colonies could be assured. I mentioned that I felt obliged to refuse positively any promise to stay impartial on related phrases, and I might solely say that we should maintain our arms free.’[12],[13]
Swiss creator George Brandes summarised this assembly:
‘Now Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador in London, requested whether or not England would agree to stay impartial if Germany kept away from violating Belgium’s neutrality. Sir Edward Gray refused. Britain needed to retain ‘a free hand’ (‘I didn’t assume we might give a promise of neutrality on that situation alone’). Would he agree if Germany have been to ensure the integrity of each France and her colonies? No.’[14]
The US historian Harry Elmer Barnes: ‘The one means whereby Gray might have prevented struggle, if in any respect, in 1914 would have been by declaring that England would stay impartial if Germany didn’t invade Belgium…,’ however Gray ‘refused to do’ this: ‘After Gray had refused to vow the German Ambassador that England would stay impartial within the occasion of Germany’s agreeing to not invade Belgium, the German ambassador requested Gray to formulate the situations in line with which England would stay impartial, however Gray refused point-blank to take action, although he afterwards falsely knowledgeable the Commons that he had said these situations’.[15] Barnes recommended the editorial of the Manchester Guardian July Thirtieth – opposing the pro-war jingoism of The Occasions – which declared: ‘not solely are we impartial now, however we’re and ought to stay impartial all through the entire course of the struggle.’
The British choose and lawyer Robert Reid was the Earl of Loreburn in addition to the Lord Chancellor of England from 1905 to 1912, so he ought to know what was occurring. His e book ‘How the Warfare Got here’ described the way it was the secret cope with France which wrecked every little thing:
The ultimate mistake was that when, on the precise disaster arising, a choice in some way would possibly and, as far as could be judged, would have averted the Continental struggle altogether … The mischief is that Sir Edward Gray slipped into a brand new coverage, however with out both Military, or treaty, or warrant of Parliamentary approval … This nation has a proper to know its personal obligations and put together to satisfy them and to determine its personal destinies. When essentially the most momentous determination of our entire historical past needed to be taken we weren’t free to determine. We entered a struggle to which we had been dedicated beforehand in the dead of night, and Parliament discovered itself at two hours’ discover unable, had it desired, to extricate us from this fearful predicament… If the federal government thought that both our honour or our security did require us to intervene on behalf of France, then they should have mentioned so unequivocally earlier than the offended Powers on the Continent dedicated themselves to irrevocable steps within the perception that we should always stay impartial. As a substitute of claiming both, they stored on saying within the despatches that their arms have been completely free, and informed the Commons the identical factor. The paperwork present conclusively that until after Germany declared struggle our Ministers had not made up their minds on both of the 2 questions, whether or not or not they’d combat for France, and whether or not or not they’d combat for Belgium. In fact Belgium was merely a hall into France, and except France was attacked Belgium was in no hazard.[16]
After it was over, US President Woodrow Wilson in March of 1919 summed up its avoidability: ‘We all know for a certainty that if Germany had thought for a second that Nice Britain would go in with France and Russia, she would by no means have undertaken the enterprise.’ (p.18, Lorenburn). That was the sense wherein Britain precipitated the dreadful battle. Clear phrases of reality might have prevented it – had that been desired.
We remind ourselves of Dr Steiner’s comparability: that the British Empire then lined one-quarter of the Earth’s land-surface; Russia one-seventh; France and her colonies one-thirteenth; and Germany, one thirty-third. (Karma, p.11)
Upon receiving a telegram from Prince Lichnowsky earlier within the day of August 1, the Kaiser ordered a bottle of champagne to rejoice, as if there could be hope of reaching a cope with Britain. Though he was simply that afternoon signing the order for mobilisation of the German military, he might in some extent have recalled it … however, it was a false hope, and a telegram from King Edward later that day defined to him that there had been a ‘misunderstanding’ between Britain’s International Secretary and the German ambassador.[17]
Grey’s Duplicity
On the twenty sixth or twenty seventh, Gray informed the Cupboard that he must resign, if it didn’t assist his initiative to take Britain into struggle in assist of ‘our ally,’ France. He wouldn’t have the ability to associate with British neutrality. Over today up till the first, or 2nd, when the struggle was simply beginning, all of the Cupboard of Britain’s Liberal Get together authorities apart from Churchill and Gray favoured British neutrality. It was these two who dragged Britain into struggle. Gray didn’t but know whether or not the Belgian authorities would say ‘no’ to the German request to be allowed to move via. To get his struggle, Gray needed to swing it on the ‘poor little Belgium’ angle. As soon as Belgium had mentioned ‘No’ and but Germany nonetheless went in – as its solely strategy to enter France – a cupboard majority would then turned assured.
On August 2nd, Gray gave to the French ambassador what amounted to British assurance of war-support. On August third, Gray gave the Commons an impassioned plea in favour of British intervention on behalf of France – making no point out of the German peace-offer. The MP Phillip Morrell spoke afterwards within the sole anti-war speech that day, and identified {that a} assure by Germany to not invade France had been provided, on situation of British neutrality, and spurned. As to why Gray didn’t point out the German supply, the view was later contrived that the German ambassador had merely been talking in a personal capability![18]
The supposed neutrality of Belgium was a sham, as ministers of that nation had secretly drawn up detailed anti-German war-plans with Britain and France. No surprise the Kaiser had a way of being ‘encircled’ by enemies, as a result of ‘“impartial” Belgium had in actuality develop into an energetic member of the coalition concluded in opposition to Germany’[19] – i.e. it had plotted in opposition to a pleasant nation. Quoting the commendably insightful George Bernard Shaw, ‘The violation of Belgian neutrality by the Germans was the mainstay of our righteousness; and we performed it off on America for way more than it was price. I guessed that when the German account of our dealings with Belgium reached the U.s., backed with an array of facsimiles of secret diplomatic paperwork found by them in Brussels, it will be discovered that our personal therapy of Belgium was as little suitable with neutrality because the German invasion.’[20]
Steiner’s View
Rudolf Steiner’s judgement in his December 1916 lecture (throughout which Britain was declining a peace supply from Germany) was:
‘Let me merely comment, that sure issues occurred from which the one wise conclusion to be drawn later turned out to be the proper one, particularly that behind those that have been in a means the puppets there stood in England a strong and influential group of people that pushed issues doggedly in the direction of a struggle with Germany and thru whom the best way was paved for the world struggle that had at all times been prophesied. For after all the best way could be paved for what it’s meant ought to occur. ..it’s inconceivable to keep away from realising how highly effective was the group who like an outpost of mighty impulses, stood behind the puppets within the foreground. These latter are after all, completely trustworthy folks, but they’re puppets, and now they are going to vanish into obscurity ….[21]
Gray and Churchill have been the 2 persistently pro-war cupboard ministers. The Conservative Get together was solidly pro-war, and Churchill was prepared to supply them a deal if perchance too most of the Liberal-party cupboard have been going to resign somewhat than go to struggle. Steiner right here remarked:
‘Anybody [in England] voicing the actual causes [for war] would have been swept away by public opinion. One thing fairly completely different was wanted – a motive which the English folks might settle for, and that was the violation of Belgian neutrality. However this primary needed to be led to. It’s actually true that Sir Edward Gray might have prevented it with a single sentence. Historical past will someday present that the neutrality of Belgium would by no means have been violated if Sir Edward Gray had made the declaration which it will have been fairly straightforward for him to make, if he had been ready to comply with his personal inclination. However since he was unable to comply with his personal inclination however needed to obey an impulse which got here from one other facet, he needed to make the declaration which made it needed for the neutrality of Belgium to be violated. Georg Brandes pointed to this. By this act England was offered with a believable motive. That had been the entire level of the train: to current England with a believable motive! To the individuals who mattered, nothing would have been extra uncomfortable than the non-violation of Belgian territory!’[22]
May powers behind Gray have needed struggle, and steered occasions in the direction of that finish? Steiner argued in opposition to the widespread view of an inevitable slide into struggle: ‘You don’t have any thought how excessively irresponsible it’s to hunt a easy continuity in these occasions, thus believing that with out extra ado the Nice World Warfare took place, or needed to come about, on account of Austria’s ultimatum to Serbia. (p.82)
We’re right here reminded of Morel’s account, of how secret plotting had paralysed debate:
‘The nemesis of their very own secret acts gripped our ministers by the throat. It paralysed their honest and determined efforts to keep up peace. It forged dissention amongst them…They might not afford to be trustworthy neither to the British folks nor to the world. They might not maintain in examine the weather making for struggle in Germany by a well timed declaration of solidarity with France and Russia, though morally dedicated to France.. In useless the Russians and the French implored them to make a pronouncement of British coverage whereas there was nonetheless time.’[23]
On August 4th, Britain declared struggle, and that similar evening lower via the transatlantic undersea phone cables popping out of Germany,[24] enabling British atrocity propaganda to work largely unchallenged. Quoting a current work on the topic, ‘The hallmark of Britain’s profitable propaganda efforts have been alleged German atrocities of gigantic proportions that strongly influenced naive People craving for a chivalrous struggle from afar’.[25]
Such constant, intentional lying was pretty revolutionary, which was why it labored so properly: ‘In that struggle, hatred propaganda was for the primary time given one thing like organised consideration’.[26] Thus, a nemesis of what Morel described as ‘futile and depraved statecraft’ right here appeared, in that British troopers have been motivated to combat, by a nonstop torrent of lies – from their very own authorities.[27]
In conclusion, can we agree with Dr Steiner? Quoting Barnes, ‘It’s thus obvious that the duty for the deadly Russian mobilisation which produced the struggle should be shared collectively, and doubtless about equally, by France and Russia.’ This was due to the French cupboard’s common encouragement, then its remaining determination to embark upon struggle on the twenty ninth July, of which Barnes remarked: ‘The key convention of Poincaré, Viviani and Messimy, in session with Izvolski, on the evening of twenty ninth of July, marks the second when the horrors of struggle have been particularly unchained in Europe.’ (pp.328, 242) This needed to be the time, it was the one alternative, as a result of these war-plotters would have recognized of the mobilisation of the world’s greatest navy, that of Nice Britain, over these fateful days, all prepared for struggle. The Russian generals browbeat the Tzar into signing the paperwork giving his assent – for a struggle he didn’t need[28]. On the Thirty first yet another determined telegram arrived from the Kaiser about how ‘The peace of Europe should be maintained’ if solely Russia would cease its mobilisation, however the Tzar now not had that skill. Germany positioned itself at a navy drawback by refraining from declaring struggle or taking steps to mobilise till the afternoon of August 1st, a lot later than any of the opposite nice powers concerned. Had a deal been reached in London on that afternoon, a battle in Japanese Europe would presumably nonetheless have taken place, however it will have been restricted and diplomats might have handled it: sure, a world struggle might have been averted.
Important texts
- Alexander Fuehr, The Neutrality of Belgium, NY 1915
- E.D. Morel, Fact and the Warfare, 1916
- The Earl Lorenburn, How the Warfare Got here, 1919
- Harry Elmer Barnes, The Genesis of the World Warfare an Introduction to the Drawback of Warfare Guilt, 1926
- British paperwork on the origins of the struggle 1898-1914, Vol XI, HMSO 1926.
- Memorandum on Resignation by John Viscount, Morley, 1928, 39pp.
- Alfred von Wegerer, A Refutation of the Versailles Warfare Guilt Thesis, 1930
- Winston Churchill, The Nice Warfare Vol. 1, 1933
- Captain Russell Grenfell, Unconditional Hatred, German Warfare Guilt and the Way forward for Europe(primarily about WW2) NY, 1954
- M. Balfour, The Kaiser and His Occasions, 1964
- Stewart Halsey Ross, Propaganda for Warfare, How america Was Conditioned to Struggle the Nice Warfare of 1914-18, 2009.
Notes
[1] Rudolf Steiner, The Karma of Untruthfulness Vol. 1 (13 lectures at Dornach, Switzerland, 4-Thirty first December 1916), 1988, p.19. NB it’s out there on-line as a Google-book, with the identical pagination as right here used. The brand new 2005 version (subtitled Secret Societies, the Media, and Preparations for the Nice Warfare) has a nice Introduction by Terry Boardman.
[2] Barnes 1926, pp.284-8.
[3] Balfour, 1964, p.351.
[4] Ross, 2009, p.9. For a letter by US diplomat and presidential advisor Colonel E.Home, regarding the pacific philosophy of the Kaiser, after a go to he paid in July 1914, see Barnes, p.523. For the ex-Kaiser’s view on ‘proof of Germany’s peaceable intentions’ i.e. how Germany had not ready for struggle or anticipated it, see: My Memoirs, 1878-1918 by Ex-Kaiser William II, 1992, Ch.10 ‘The Outbreak of Warfare.’
[5] Morel, p.122: Germany had ‘for forty and 4 years stored the peace when struggle broke out in August … No different Nice Energy can boast such a report.’ (Morel’s e book could also be considered on-line)
[6] Balfour, 1964, p.354
[7] Morel, 1916, pp.6, 8, 13 and 42.
[8] Churchill, 1933, Vol. 1, p.107.
[9] Churchill, ibid., has the British fleet secretly mobilised over the evening of 29-Thirtieth July. Hugh Martin, in Battle, the Life-story of the Rt Hon. Winston Churchill, 1937: ‘Churchill, upon his personal duty and in opposition to the specific determination of the Cupboard, ordered the mobilisation of the Naval Reserve’ On the twenty seventh, ‘the fleet [was] despatched North to stop the potential for it being bottled up,’ p.105. A ‘Take a look at Mobilisation’ of the complete Royal Navy paraded earlier than the King on July twenty sixth, at Spitalhead, after which the Navy was held full battle-readiness (The Life and Occasions of Lord Mountbatten, John Terrence 1968, p11-14); then, ‘On July twenty ninth Churchill secretly ordered the core of the fleet to maneuver north to its protected wartime base .. driving at prime velocity and with its lights out, it tore via the evening up the North sea.’ (To Finish All Wars, How WW1 Divided Britain, 2011, Adam Hochschild, p.85).
[10] The primary indication for the Kaiser of war-imminence, was when he realized that the English fleet ‘had not dispersed after the assessment at Spitalhead however had remained concentrated.’ (My Memoirs, p.241).
[11] Bertrand Russell, Autobiography, Vol. 1, 1967, p.239. H.G. Wells judged that: ‘I feel he (Grey) needed the struggle and I feel he needed it to return when it did … The cost is, that he didn’t positively warn Germany, that we should always definitely come into the struggle, that he was sufficiently ambiguous to let her take a danger and assault, and that he did this intentionally. I feel that this cost is sound.’ (Experiment in an Autobiography, II, 1934, p.770)
[12] Edward Gray letter Aug 1st: Britain’s ‘Blue Guide,’ HMSO, 1926, p.261. See additionally Morley 1928, p.38-9.
[13] The noncommittal angle expressed by Gray on August 1st to the German ambassador had been endorsed by the Cupboard and Prime Minister: Roy Jenkins, Asquith 1964, p.363.
[14] Steiner, Karma, p.18: Georg Brandes, Farbenblinde Neutralität, Zurich 1916 (Brandes was Danish). Steiner quotes extensively from it, Karma, pp. 14-23.
[15] Barnes, 1926, p.497.
[16] Loreburn, 1919, pp.15-19.
[17] Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World Warfare2001 CUP p.219-223: Lichinowsky’s telegram misunderstood (NB I’m not endorsing her thesis of German war-guilt).
[18] Gray informed cupboard about speak with Lichinowsky on third, with a declare that the latter’s views have been ‘merely private and unauthorised.’ (Morley, pp.13-14) In that case, why was the dialog recorded and revealed in Britain’s ‘White Guide’ of key wartime paperwork? How might a German Ambassador make a merely private proposal? Different such ‘White Guide’ paperwork have been recorded as private, however not this one. As Morel identified (pp.26-7), the UK’s ‘Blue Guide’ revealed its account of this interview with no trace that the Ambassador was merely appearing privately – and Lichinowsky’s telegram to his Authorities dated 8.30 pm, August 1, indicated that he had been appearing on ‘directions.’ His supply was usually concordant with telegrams then being despatched by the Kaiser and German Minister of International Affairs. (Morel, p.26)
[19] Fuehr, 1915, pp.90, 117. (For feedback on Fuehr see Ross 2009, pp.116-7: Fuehr’s account was ‘definitely biased’ however ‘well-documented.’) For the incriminating paperwork, see Ross p.300, observe 55. The Kaiser recalled how piles of British army-coats and maps of Belgium have been discovered hid across the Belgian border, in anticipation of the struggle: My Memoirs, p.251-2.
[20] Ross, 2009, p.42.
[21] Steiner, Karma, pp.84-5.
[22] Ibid, p.86.
[23] Morel 1916, p.297.
[24] Ross, 2009, pp.15, 27.
[25] Ibid, p.3.
[26] Grenfell, 1954, p.125.
[27] Likewise from the French authorities: Barnes, …For a common remark see Georges Thiel, Heresy: ‘One grows dizzy on the itemizing of all these lies [against Germany] which, afterwards, have been demolished one after the opposite.’ Historic Overview Press, 2006, p.31.
[28] For the Ex-Kaiser’s account of how, as he later realized, his telegrams significantly affected Tzar Nicholas in these essential days, see: My Memoirs, Ch.10.
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